US #Counterintelligence #CIA #FBI
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US counterintelligence is currently deemed dysfunctional and inefficient due to fractured, myopic efforts, inadequate threat coverage (less than 10% of high-priority targets), and slow, bureaucratic processes. The SECURE Act aims to modernize this by shifting to an offensive mindset, enhancing interagency collaboration, and ensuring proactive technology adoption. [1, 2, 3] – AI OverviewProblems with US Counterintelligence
Fractured and Non-Strategic: Efforts are decentralized and often fail to adopt a comprehensive, nation-wide strategic view against adversaries, operating with little coordination among agency components.
Inefficient Personnel & Processes: Background investigations and security checks are slow, with backlogs in the thousands, and procedures for sharing intelligence are often cumbersome and delayed.
Failed Security Controls: Mismanagement of classified documents and weak monitoring of foreign personnel and intellectual property allow for easy penetration.
Lack of Offensive Action: There is a heavy reliance on defensive postures, with insufficient efforts to take the fight to the adversary, leaving many foreign intelligence activities in the US unchallenged.
Insider Threats: Insufficient focus on detecting and preventing insider threats, coupled with a lack of consistent “continuous evaluation” of cleared personnel. [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]How the SECURE Act Addresses These Issues
Offensive Strategy: The Act encourages a proactive approach that enables counterintelligence to control adversary perceptions and prevent threats, rather than just reacting to them.
Centralized Coordination: It focuses on bridging the gap between various intelligence services and Law Enforcement (LE), improving collaboration between the FBI and CIA.
Modernization: It pushes for the adoption of new technologies to handle cyber threats and sophisticated foreign operations.
Enhanced Security Oversight: It reinforces the need for strict, modernized control over classified documents and cybersecurity practices, addressing past failures in security management.
Personnel Security Reform: The act works towards tackling the slow clearance processes by reforming the personnel security system. [3, 4, 5, 9, 10]AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] oig.justice.gov/sites/defaul…
[2] intelligence.house.gov/2025/…
[3] thehill.com/opinion/national…
[4] govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-…
[5] sgp.fas.org/library/pfiab/fi…
[6] justsecurity.org/117927/real…
[7] dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents…
[8] ieeexplore.ieee.org/document…
[9] avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_cen…
[10] amuedge.com/training-police-…Pic.: google.com/search?num=10&new…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Apr 6, 2026
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The Analysis of the problems with the US Counterintelligence (it is dysfunctional and inefficient) and how the Secure Act intends to address them – Google Search google.com/search?q=The+Anal…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Apr 6, 2026
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Lawmakers are advancing the SECURE Act (Strategy for Executive-led Counterintelligence and Unified Reform) to transition U.S. counterintelligence from a reactive, law-enforcement-centric model to a proactive and unified offensive posture. Introduced by House Intelligence Committee Chairman Rick Crawford, the bill is a central component of the FY2026 Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA). [1, 2, 3, 4]
Key Objectives of the SECURE Act
The legislation aims to address critical vulnerabilities that experts warn could lead to a “9/11-scale intelligence failure” if left unaddressed. [1]Offensive Mandate: Redefines the legal definition of counterintelligence from merely “protecting” to a mandate to “deter, disrupt, investigate, and exploit” foreign intelligence operations.
Unified Leadership: Empowers a newly created Director of Counterintelligence with the authority to direct and compel cooperation between various services, moving beyond simple coordination to close exploitable “seams” in the system.
Strategic Targeting: Specifically reorients resources toward countering “great power adversaries” (such as Russia and China) by using deception and other tools to neutralize state-sponsored networks.
Congressional Transparency: Requires the FBI to notify Congress when initiating counterintelligence investigations into federal officeholders or candidates. [2, 3, 4, 5]Current Legislative Status
House Progress: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed the FY2026 IAA, including the SECURE Act provisions, in September 2025.
Broader Reform Context: This effort coincides with intense debates over the April 2026 expiration of FISA Section 702, with some lawmakers pushing for stricter warrant requirements alongside these structural counterintelligence reforms. [3, 6, 7, 8, 9]Would you like to see how these new counterintelligence powers might interact with the upcoming FISA Section 702 reauthorization?
[1] intelligence.house.gov
[2] intelligence.house.gov
[3] intelligence.house.gov
[4] intelligence.house.gov
[5] thehill.com
[6] brennancenter.org
[7] intelligence.house.gov
[8] biggs.house.gov
[9] justsecurity.org— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Apr 5, 2026