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On November 27, Kyrgyzstan will host the annual summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Bishkek, bringing together foreign ministers, defense ministers, and security council secretaries from member states. While often portrayed in Russian media as an Eurasian analogue to NATO, the CSTO remains an organization heavily dependent on Russian military power. Should Moscow withdraw or reduce its support, the Organization’s relevance would likely collapse.
A stark illustration of this fragility is Armenia, whose Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will boycott the summit entirely. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov confirmed that Armenia will not attend the session of the Collective Security Council, the CSTO’s highest governing body, though it does not object to the adoption of bloc-wide documents.
According to the CSTO press service, the Council is expected to adopt a declaration outlining member states’ joint positions on current security challenges. Also on the agenda is the formal appointment of the next Secretary General for the 2026-2029 term, and the unveiling of Russia’s priorities for its upcoming presidency in 2026.
President Vladimir Putin’s speech on these priorities is expected to dominate the summit. Armenia’s withdrawal highlights the CSTO’s waning cohesion, maintained largely by members’ reliance on Russian security assistance, a dynamic in place since the Treaty’s inception in Tashkent on May 15, 1992. The original signatories included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joining in 1993. The treaty entered into force in 1994.
Its central provision, Article 4, mandates collective defense: an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, obligating military and other forms of assistance in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
In 1999, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan signed a protocol extending the treaty, establishing an automatic renewal every five years. The formal CSTO was created in 2002; its charter was registered with the UN the following year, and it has held observer status at the UN General Assembly since 2004.
For Armenia, the CSTO’s relevance has waned dramatically since the bloc declined to intervene during the final phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. Yerevan’s disenchantment, however, predates 2023 and stretches back to the 2021–2022 border clashes, when it also felt the organization had failed to provide meaningful support. Kazakhstan, by contrast, remains a key beneficiary: the rapid CSTO deployment in January 2022 played a central role in stabilizing the country during a period of acute domestic unrest.
As the current Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov – an influential figure from the “Old Kazakhstan” elite – completes his term, the position is scheduled to rotate to Taalatbek Masadykov of Kyrgyzstan. Ushakov confirmed that Tasmagambetov will deliver a final report on the Organization’s activities and security concerns before officially stepping down on January 1. Masadykov, currently Deputy Secretary General, is expected to assume the role seamlessly.
While Masadykov brings diplomatic gravitas, the question remains whether he can restrain Moscow and Minsk from pushing CSTO allies toward confrontation with NATO. Tasmagambetov leaves behind a significant legacy and an open question for Astana: where to place this seasoned, politically influential figure who has previously served as Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Ambassador to Russia, and more, after his CSTO tenure ends.
Masadykov, best known for his 2017 Kyrgyz presidential bid, is a veteran diplomat and international affairs expert. His résumé includes service in the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, academic leadership at the American University of Central Asia, and deputy chairmanship of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council. Since January 2024, he has served as Deputy Secretary General of the CSTO and holds the diplomatic rank of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.
The 28-point peace plan for Ukraine, leaked to the press last week, left many wondering about its origins. The document repeated many of the talking points previously voiced by the Kremlin. Even the language of the plan looked to some as if it was translated from Russian. The confusion grew after a group of U.S. lawmakers claimed Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that it was a Russian proposal. Rubio was quick to deny that and insist the plan was an American one, based on “the input from the Russian side.”
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Whatever the origins, the plan is a disaster for Ukraine and Europe for several reasons.
First, it would force Ukraine to voluntarily hand over to Russia territory it doesn’t control. That includes some of the most heavily fortified land in Donetsk region, which would make a new Russian assault on Kyiv an easy walk. Ukraine has always insisted that the conflict should be frozen along the current frontlines, and that a ceasefire must be a pre-condition for any further talks.
Second, it severely limits Ukraine’s sovereignty by capping the size of its armed forces to 600,000, and by forcing it to abandon NATO aspirations and enshrine neutrality in its constitution (Ukraine was constitutionally a neutral country before Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014). Giving the Russian language and Russian Orthodox Church more rights might seem like innocent provisions, but the Moscow-centered institution would increase the Kremlin’s influence inside Ukraine.
Third, the plan foresees an amnesty for “all parties”—including Russian soldiers, who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine. Among them are those responsible for a massacre of civilians in Bucha, the bombing of maternity hospitals in Mariupol, the illegal deportation of 19,500 Ukrainian children, and ongoing drone attacks on civilians in Kherson. There is a huge demand for justice inside Ukraine—and this plan does nothing to address it.
Fourth, the plan doesn’t offer any concrete security guarantees for Ukraine and relies heavily on Russia’s goodwill not to invade again. It ignores the fact that Russia has violated numerous international and bilateral commitments since 2014. It rewards and empowers the aggressor by forcing the victim to compromise on issues vital for its survival.
The plan would leave Ukraine—and Europe at large—extremely vulnerable to more, not less, Russian aggression. Nobody in Ukraine trusts Russia—the general consensus is it would use any deal or pause in the fighting to rearm, regroup, and attack again. Russia would also be more tempted to test Europe’s resolve by attacking a E.U. or NATO member, like one of the Baltic states. The German defense chief has already warned NATO to prepare for a possible attack there by 2029.
Fortunately, the pushback has been strong, and there is a new 19-point U.S.-Ukraine plan. Negotiations are expected today between U.S. and Russian officials in Abu Dhabi, as is a meeting between President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Donald Trump later this week. Whatever the outcome, though, all of this must become a wake-up call for Europe.
Over the past year, since Trump returned to office, Europeans understood they needed to do more for their own security. Concrete actions followed, like major commitments to ramp up defense spending levels to 5% of GDP. Europe assumed the role of main buyer of U.S. weapons for Ukraine. Europe has also done commendable work on sustaining Ukraine’s frail financial system and covering most of its civilian budget needs.
Yet Europe’s role in diplomacy around Ukraine has been lacking. Fortunately, Europe offered a counterproposal to Trump’s peace plan, some of which has likely been incorporated into the new U.S.-Ukraine proposal. But the back-and-forth underscores how Europe still largely outsources diplomatic initiative to the U.S. and is forced to do damage control every time Trump’s mood on Ukraine changes (usually after speaking with the Russians). Europe understands the nature of the Russian threat much better, and its leaders have more experience dealing with Putin. What seems to be lacking is confidence—and unity. It is time for Europeans to step up, commit more resources by making the Coalition of the Willing more ambitious, and apply maximum pressure on Russia, for starters, by finally seizing its €210 billion in frozen assets.
Europe—which includes the E.U. and the U.K.—cannot just react when their house is on fire. It is becoming increasingly clear it cannot trust the Trump Administration to bring the war in Ukraine to an outcome which is favorable for Europe. Europe has to show agency and demonstrate it is ready, just like Ukraine, to stand up and fight.
