A recent article in the Hungarian pro-government media platform PestiSrácok alleged that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) was planning strikes against Romania and Poland using “captured and restored” Russian drones launched from western Ukraine. The piece, however, presented no documentary evidence, photos, videos, or official statements to substantiate the claim, relying instead on anonymous sources and speculation.
Author spreads pro-Kremlin narratives
The article was written by Magyar B. Tamás, a columnist with a record of amplifying narratives aligned with Moscow. He has repeatedly published material in PestiSrácok that mirrors Kremlin talking points, often presenting rumors and unverified assumptions as logical conclusions. Analysts have long classified the outlet, part of the KESMA/Mediaworks conglomerate, as an actor within Hungary’s pro-Kremlin media ecosystem.
False flag allegations without proof
The article’s central claim—that Ukraine could use Russian-made drones against NATO members Romania and Poland—was presented without supporting material such as serial numbers, satellite imagery, or independent verification. Instead, it cited vague references to “sources” while admitting the information amounted to little more than hearsay. This method of replacing evidence with suppositions is a standard disinformation tactic.
Synchronization with Russian foreign ministry
Shortly after publication, the same themes were echoed almost verbatim by Russian officials and state media. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova repeated the claims, followed by outlets such as RIA, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Vesti, MK, and Sputnik. Their messaging invoked scenarios of “World War III” and comparisons to the Gleiwitz incident, underscoring the coordinated nature of the narrative push.
Strategic interests and risks
Ukraine relies heavily on military aid transiting through Poland and Romania, making the suggestion that Kyiv would attack its own supply hubs implausible. Analysts note that only Moscow would benefit from undermining trust in NATO’s eastern flank. The timing also coincides with real incidents in September 2025, when Russian drones violated Polish airspace, prompting Russian media to project a “mirror narrative” by accusing Ukraine of plotting provocations.
Disinformation as psychological preparation
The near-simultaneous repetition of the Hungarian article’s claims by Russian state actors suggests pre-planned information operations aimed at preparing audiences for potential escalation. By framing NATO countries as possible targets of Ukrainian attacks, Moscow seeks to deflect attention from its own violations of allied airspace and to reduce accountability for future incidents beyond Ukraine’s borders.
