Day: September 18, 2025
Labour Migration to Belgium Declines as EU Posting Rules Reshape Workforce
Labour migration to Belgium is slowing, with fewer foreign workers being sent to the country from other EU states, reports 24brussels.
In 2024, 205,000 individuals worked in Belgium under EU “posting” rules, marking a nearly 25% decrease from the 2017 peak of 267,000. This framework allows workers from EU member states, such as a Portuguese construction worker, to temporarily operate on Belgian sites while remaining covered by their home country’s social security.
Furthermore, there has been a notable increase in “double postings.” This refers to non-EU workers first employed in another EU nation before being sent to Belgium. Approximately 50,000 individuals from countries including Ukraine, Brazil, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and India worked in Belgium under this arrangement in 2024, reflecting a 10% rise over the past two years.
Additional metrics also indicate a downward trend in labour migration. The issuance of long-stay work visas decreased by 9% last year, with just over 8,000 granted, while the total number of new work residence permits remained stagnant at around 39,000.
These developments highlight the changing dynamics of labour migration within Belgium, as both EU and non-EU workers navigate evolving regulations. The implications of this slowdown for the Belgian economy and specific sectors reliant on foreign labour are yet to be fully assessed. Policymakers may need to evaluate the effectiveness of current migration policies and consider adjustments to support workforce demands in key industries.
The situation is compounded by the ongoing geopolitical challenges posed by events in Ukraine and other global contexts, which may affect migration patterns moving forward. Observers note that Belgium’s ability to adapt to these changes will be crucial in maintaining its economic stability.
As the government seeks to manage these shifts, the emphasis will likely be on balancing the need for a skilled workforce with the complexities of international labour laws and bilateral agreements.
Illustration picture shows a construction worker in Brussels © BELGA PHOTO BERNAL REVERT
Russia’s military-industrial complex continues to receive high-precision machine tools from Taiwan in 2024–2025, despite multiple sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom. These machines reach sanctioned Russian factories through “grey logistics” — a network of dealers, re-exporters and shell companies in Turkey, the UAE and China. Investigations reveal that several Taiwanese producers indirectly support the re-equipment and expansion of Russia’s weapons industry.
Taiwanese Exports Replacing Global Suppliers
Taiwan has long been known as a global hub for CNC (computer numerical control) machine tools. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Taiwanese firms stepped in to replace European, Japanese and South Korean companies that had withdrawn from the Russian market. By 2023, Taiwan had become the main source of precision tools for Russia’s defence sector. According to investigations by The Insider and Taiwanese outlet The Reporter, between March and September 2023 Russia imported at least 193 Taiwanese machines worth nearly $29 million, around 80% of which arrived via Turkey and China.
In April 2022, Taipei announced support for international sanctions on Moscow, initially targeting semiconductors, telecommunications and aerospace. It was not until January 2023 that restrictions on high-precision machine tools were added. Direct exports from Taiwan to Russia then fell to zero, but Russian buyers quickly turned to illegal re-export through third countries, maintaining supplies despite the ban.
How the Supply Chain Works
The pattern is familiar: a Taiwanese manufacturer sells to an authorised distributor in Turkey, the UAE or China. The intermediary then alters the paperwork — often changing product codes — and ships the machines to Russian importers or associated plants. Shell companies, shipment fragmentation and re-labelling as “used equipment” are common practices. Manufacturers typically claim they do not monitor their distributors or disclose client lists, allowing this trade to continue unchecked.
Major Taiwanese Brands Involved
At least five Taiwanese companies are linked to these shipments: Takisawa, I Machine Tools Corp., E-Tech Machinery, Micro Dynamics and Buffalo Machinery (Microcut). Open-source researchers confirm that their CNC grinders, lathes and 5-axis machining centres are directly suited for producing missile parts, aerospace systems and precision electronics. Models such as the E-Tech Easy 2040 NC, Takisawa LA-250 and Twister 685 5-axis are used to manufacture casings, cylinders, targeting systems and missile guidance devices.
Links to Sanctioned Russian Enterprises
Evidence shows direct connections between these Taiwanese machines and Russian companies under Western sanctions. Takisawa equipment has been identified at NPO Splav in Tula, E-Tech systems at IEMZ Kupol in Izhevsk, and Micro Dynamics machines at NPP Istok in Fryazino, a Rostec entity. Buffalo Machinery products were traced to MIT Corporation in Moscow, linked to Roscosmos. These firms play key roles in missile production, electronic warfare and aerospace technologies.
Sponsoring Aggression and Risk of Secondary Sanctions
The ongoing supply of dual-use machine tools strengthens Russia’s capacity to produce missiles, artillery systems and electronics. Deliveries to conglomerates such as Rostec, Almaz-Antey and Roscosmos amount to tangible support for weapons systematically deployed against civilians in Ukraine. Analysts warn that such practices expose Taiwanese manufacturers and their partners to possible secondary sanctions and even legal liability for enabling war crimes. As one investigation summarised, supplying Russia’s defence sector is equivalent to sponsoring aggression.
Pressure on Taiwan’s Export Controls
Despite formal restrictions, weak oversight of distribution networks allows machines to keep reaching Russia. Without tighter monitoring, secondary sanctions on intermediaries and greater accountability for manufacturers ignoring end-use risks, Taiwan risks losing credibility with its Western partners. The absence of robust end-user verification effectively turns companies like Takisawa, E-Tech and Buffalo Machinery into de facto accomplices of Russia’s war effort, with their products becoming true “tools of war”.
