Day: June 19, 2025

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Donald Trump expected his first face-to-face meeting with Barack Obama would be all of “10 or 15 minutes.” After all, the pair had spent years circling each other, trading barbs from afar and using the other’s political movement as a blend of punching bag and strawman. The mutual enmity was hardly a secret; Obama’s trolling of Trump at a White House correspondents’ dinner set in motion the New Yorker’s serious contemplation of Redemption By White House Win.

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The 2016 summit between the President-elect and the incumbent ended up going 90 minutes, during which North Korea was, to Trump’s mind, the big takeaway. (Obama’s team recalled the conversation differently.) The message was pretty clear: that rogue nation was one of the biggest problems Trump was inheriting as he rose to power after the 2016 election. The election clearly did not go as Obama had hoped so he had this one set piece to convey to his successor just how fraught the situation on the Korean Peninsula was, and how any misstep could be fatal to millions.

The outgoing President’s concern was that Trump, or some of his top advisers, might want to try to swap regimes. But history is lined with examples why these trades have never gone as planned. And Obama wanted to convey the risks of both a nuclear-armed free agent and a country decapitated without a clear next step. Obama hated the threat of a nuclear North Korea but also understood how things might escalate in some pretty terrible ways if unchecked emotions and amateur gut sense took over.

Maybe—despite his own instincts—Trump understood that regime change was not compatible with this worldview. Instead, he courted the North Koreans and broke a half century of protocol in visiting with the reclusive regime’s chief. In fact, as a candidate, and even well before that, Trump resisted any suggestion of intervention. That positioning helped Trump remake the Republican Party by elevating its isolationist wing.

It’s why the current moment is such a challenge for Trump: Israel’s strikes on Iran lure dreams of a time after an Ayatollah runs the Islamic Republic. But dreams can easily turn into nightmares, and this particular lullaby is more than a little discordant.

“Regime change” has become shorthand in national-security circles the same way “nation building” and “mission accomplished” have devolved from well-considered policy goals into collapsed folly. U.S. intervention into foreign nations’ governance in pursuit of friendlier—if not less-lethal—regimes has proven a loser. In recent years, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya have all provided proof of the model’s overly optimistic lens on the map. 

Going back in the post-World War II era, history has shown the United States very capable at both toppling governments and then promptly getting the sequel disastrously wrong. For every regime change at the hands of Americans that went well—think Adolf Hitler’s exit from Germany and Benito Mussolini from Italy—there are multitudes that went off the rails: six overt attempts during the Cold War and another 64 in covert operations.

And just about no one on the political stage this century has been more clear-eyed on that reality than Trump.

Dating to his days as a celebrity host of a reality show, Trump hated foreign adventurism, although he did tell Howard Stern he supported the Iraq war a month before Congress voted on it.

After launching his presidential bid in 2015, he campaigned endlessly against so-called “forever wars” and creeping American meddling. He blasted decisions to engage beyond U.S. borders as simply stupid. He called regime change a dangerous precedent that violated sovereignty and wasted cache. For Trump, the ability to topple rivals was enough of a threat without taking it out of the safe.

“Obviously, the war in Iraq was a big, fat mistake, all right?” Trump said in a February 2016 debate.

Months later, after he won election but before he took office, Trump seemed to redouble his skepticism of the military’s reach into other governments. 

“We will stop racing to topple foreign regimes that we know nothing about, that we shouldn’t be involved with,” the President-elect said in December of 2016.

There’s a reason why regime change has been a non-starter. Democrats hated it when George W. Bush tried it, particularly with Iraq. Republicans hated the blowback they faced for Bush’s errors. Independents loathed the fallout. Swing-state voters hated that their kids were sent onto battlefields they didn’t understand. Fiscal conservatives hated the costs. Fiscal liberals hated the opportunity costs. In Iraq alone, 4,000 Americans and 100,000 Iraqis lost their lives.

Trump gets that. He may not have a grasp on the nuances of the foreign policy but he certainly gets the zeitgeist. And, as has been the case for two decades, the patience for a thrust beyond U.S. borders is limited.

Want proof? Look at the post-WW2 landscape. South Korea, Greece, and Syria all fell to U.S. meddling before 1950 even got here. Burma, Egypt, Iraq, Guatemala, Indonesia, Syria (again), Cambodia, and Cuba all followed. Far-flung efforts in the Dominican Republic, Laos, Brazil, Chile, Ethiopia, Bolivia, Afghanistan, and even Poland followed. Grenada, Panama, and Haiti left U.S. administrations in the political muck. Vietnam was the biggest catastrophe to most Americans’ memories. 

Put in the crudest terms, the United States is really good at ignoring what Washington has coined the Pottery Barn Rule: you break it, you own it. Yes, we can break a whole lot, and have. But the United States does not exactly have total control over what it knocks off the shelf. 

Which brings us back to Iran, which sits dangerously close to the ledge’s edge. In public comments, Trump is being very cagey about what he does next. “I may do it, I may not do it, nobody knows what I’m going to do,” Trump said Wednesday about the prospect of launching an air strike on an Iranian nuclear facility.

Read more: A New Middle East Is Unfolding Before Our Eyes

Yet undermining that cautiousness is Trump’s apparent acceptance of Israel’s view that Iran is racing toward building a nuclear weapon. That assessment is at odds with the U.S. intelligence community’s view, which remains consistent that that’s not the case. “I don’t care what she said,” Trump said on Tuesday, referring to recent testimony of Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard that Iran isn’t actively trying to build a bomb. 

Trump may have been brutal about Bush getting the intel wrong on Iraq, but it seems he may not have learned the risks of rushing into the mix with incomplete or manipulated facts. Trump is, at his core, a gut-driven figure who has proven adept at finding voices that confirm his instinct—and banishing those who challenge it.

Trump might despise the existing regime in Tehran, but he also does not want to be left with another shattered nation in that region with little more than epoxy as a plan. Yet even members of his own base fear he may be about to do just that, dragging the country into the very kind of boondoggle he won office by denouncing and abandoning the isolationism that he inserted into the GOP’s new DNA.

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